Philadelphia is presented as a practical test of whether representatives can be chosen across large constituencies: its population of roughly 50,000 to 60,000 was expected to make it nearly two federal districts, while the city still formed one county and elected a single member to Pennsylvania’s executive council. In the essays’ wider argument, this local example helps defend representative government and the proposed Constitution against the claim that large-scale political arrangements are inherently unmanageable.

Electoral Scale and Local Government

The argument compares the expected scale of federal representation with established state practices. Philadelphia was supposed to contain between fifty and sixty thousand people, enough to form nearly two districts for choosing federal representatives. Yet it constituted only one county for state legislative elections, where every elector voted for each of the county’s representatives. The city also elected one member to Pennsylvania’s executive council. These arrangements are offered as evidence that voters could choose representatives across a substantial constituency without losing the ability to make a choice.

The comparison does not treat the city as an isolated case. It follows references to electoral districts in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, and adds Pennsylvania as another example of large constituencies already operating within state government. The point is not that federal and state offices are identical, but that the practical capacity to elect representatives does not disappear when the electorate grows: if voters can choose several representatives at once, the argument holds, they can also choose one.

The Example in the Debate over Representation

Philadelphia’s population and county organization serve as concrete evidence against the suspicion that broad constituencies would necessarily produce unworthy representatives or undermine public liberty. The essay asks whether experience in Pennsylvania and other states has shown that officials elected by larger divisions of the people are more disposed to sacrifice the many to the few. It cites the city’s executive-council election, alongside state legislative elections, to challenge that fear through existing practice rather than abstract speculation.

The city’s role is therefore evidentiary, not merely geographic. It anchors a comparison between local political arrangements and the proposed federal system, supporting the larger claim that national representation can encompass extensive electorates while leaving local and particular interests to state institutions. Philadelphia is invoked as a working example of electoral scale: one city, one county, a large body of voters, and a single seat on the executive council, all brought to bear on the question of whether representative government can function across wider constituencies.